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Sean M. Maloney 
The dec i s ion n o t to deploy 4 C a n a d i a n Mechanized Brigade (CMB) to participate in 
the Gulf War may eventually be of interest to 
s tudents of Canadian defence policy. The current 
lack of available material on this subject will no 
doubt at tenuate such efforts. The purpose of this 
article is to provide a brief, and very tentative, 
discussion of relevant factors contributing to the 
decision not to go. In essence, the following should 
be considered a "toe in the water" ra ther t han a 
"headlong dive." 
On 2 August 1990, Iraq overran and occupied 
its smaller neighbour Kuwait. This act not only 
threatened the delicate balance of power in the Middle 
East but posed a direct threat to the economic well-
being of the Western world. If Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf s ta tes were invaded in tu rn by Iraq, 
the flow of Persian Gulf oil would be s h u t off, 
adversely affecting other pa r t s of the world. 
Additionally, the morally repugnant and brutal 
occupation of Kuwait, coupled with the seizure of 
Western e m b a s s i e s a n d ci t izens ( including 
Canadians) were indications that Saddam Hussein 
could not be negotiated with. The United Nations, 
with unprecedented haste, passed Resolutions 660 
and 661 , demanding tha t Iraq vacate Kuwait 
immediately or face imposit ion of economic 
sanctions. 
In the wake of the conflict, a great deal of criticism 
was levelled at the apparent inability of the Army to 
Opposite: Private Mike Robitaille stands sentry at 
the entrance to Canada Dry 2 in Qatar. 
(CFPU IWC 90-333) 
deploy and sus ta in a brigade-sized force in a 
regional conflict. Much of this criticism resulted 
from inter-service disputes and defence budgetary 
mat ters . This could be ignored except tha t the 
alleged inability of the Army to conduct such a 
deployment was u s e d by some to call into 
quest ion the viability of Canada ' s land force 
commitment to NATO's Central Region since 
1951. It t hus deserves examination. 
Responding to the U.N.'s request for forces 
to enforce the economic sanctions, Prime Minister 
Mulroney announced the deployment of a Canadian 
naval task group to the Persian Gulf on 10 August. 
Operation FRICTION had started. Other commands 
within the Canadian Forces were anticipating further 
action on the part of the Canadian Government and 
used their initiative to p repare a n u m b e r of 
contingency p lans in case the senior military 
leadership had to provide options to the political 
leadership. By 13 August, seven contingency plans 
were proposed even though no detailed staff work 
on them had been done. In order of priority these 
plans included: 
1. Evacuation of Canadian nationals from the 
Gulf Region 
2. The deployment ofCF-18s to Turkey 
3 . Resupply and s u s t a i n the Operat ion 
FRICTION task group 
4. Replace vessels involved in Operation 
FRICTION 
5. In-theatre airlift support to Pan-Arab forces 
6. Logistical support to multi-national forces 
in Gulf region 
7. The Deployment of Ground Combat Forces. 
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Two soldiers from 3rd Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment on patrol at Canada Dry 2 in Qatar. 
(CFPU ISC 90-5050) 
As the Canadian naval task group departed on 
24 August for its "Persian Excursion," the first 
U.S. pre-positioning ships from Diego Garcia 
disgorged enough equipment for two U.S. Marine 
Corps divisions. By 25 August, the U.N. passed 
Resolution 665, which permit ted the use of 
military force to back up the economic sanctions 
against Iraq. 
Around this time, Canadian Forces Europe 
had prepared a contingency plan to deploy a CF-
18 squadron and an Army protection uni t to an 
undes ignated location in the Persian Gulf. This 
was a logical contingency to the planners who felt 
tha t the ships would require air cover and the 
aircraft would require protection from hostile 
ground forces. This contingency was quickly 
adopted by the Government a n d Operat ion 
SCIMITAR was announced on 14 September. The 
first CF-18s from CFB Baden left on 6 October 
for their base in Qatar, which had been secured 
by "M" Company 3 Royal Canandian Regiment 
(RCR), from Baden-Soellingen. 
The air force planners had to be convinced to 
take a security company with them. Later on, "C" 
Company 1 Royal 22e Régiment (R22eR) took over 
as Security Company for the Operation SCIMITAR 
bases CANADA DRY 1 and CANADA DRY 2. The 
security threa t was rated as "high" in theatre; 
S a d d a m H u s s e i n publ ic ly a n n o u n c e d t h a t 
terrorist groups sympathetic to Iraq would wreak 
havoc within those nations arrayed against him. 
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The Americans had already committed a 
Mar ine divis ion, an a i r b o r n e divis ion, an 
airmobile division and a mechanized division to 
Saudi Arabia for Operation DESERT SHIELD. 
In a d d i t i o n to t h i s , t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m 
announced Operation GRANBY on 14 September. 
Operation GRANBY deployed the 7th Armoured 
Brigade from British Army of the Rhine (BAOR); 
at the same time, France implemented Operation 
DAGUET w h i c h d e p o s i t e d t h e 6 t h L igh t 
Armoured Division into the desert sands of Saudi 
Arabia. The British wanted to bring in an entire 
three-brigade division to Saudi Arabia b u t could 
only provide 7th Armoured Brigade initially, 
followed by 4 t h A r m o u r e d Br igade on 22 
November. Sometime a round 14 September, 
C a n a d i a n off icers a t h i g h e r - l e v e l NATO 
h e a d q u a r t e r s were informally con tac ted by 
Bri t ish officers from BAOR. Could C a n a d a 
provide a brigade under British control to form a 
Commonwealth Division along the same lines as 
the Korea conflict in 1951? 
This was a tempting request. It was, however, 
fraught with problems. The political dimensions went 
well beyond command and control on the battlefield. 
Some Canadian officers believed that the British 
wanted "more flags" on the battlefield to balance out 
Amer ican influence; in the Br i t i sh m i n d a 
Commonwea l th p a r t n e r migh t be eas ier to 
influence t h a n say, the French. This would be 
impor tan t in the pos t -war resolut ion of the 
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conflict. In Canada, however, there were the issues 
of national pride and the old colonial relationship. 
For this and other reasons, the British proposal 
was put on hold. 
Canadian military staff planners at all levels 
knew that force would ultimately be needed to 
evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. They also knew 
from the list of p lanning priorities generated in 
August that the last Canadian option was to 
deploy ground troops to Saudi Arabia. Canadian 
initiative ope ra t ed a t new h e i g h t s . Mobile 
Command HQ (FMC HQ), with input from 1st 
Canadian Division, conducted a quick staff check 
on 26 October on the feasibility of providing a 
brigade-sized formation to Saudi Arabia. The 
assumptions in this staff check formed the basis 
for what would eventually be called Operation 
BROADSWORD. 
FMC HQ determined tha t any Canad ian 
formation sent to Saudi Arabia would have to fight in 
a high-intensity battlefield environment, a battlefield 
that probably would include the use of chemical and 
biological weapons. The headquarters also assumed 
that Canadian units in Europe could be released by 
SACEUR for ope ra t i ons . F u r t h e r m o r e , the 
planners knew that such a formation would have 
to work wi th in the f ramework of a h igher 
formation like an Allied division or corps. More 
importantly, any Canadian contribution less than 
a brigade group was unacceptable for "visibility 
reasons." 
After surveying the existing formations in the 
Canadian Army, FMC HQ determined tha t the 
formation best suited for operations in the Middle 
E a s t w a s 4 CMB. I t w a s a t 7 5 % of w a r 
establishment strength, while the other brigades 
in Canada ranged from 70% to 45% of their 
establ ishment. Only 4 CMB h a d main batt le 
tanks . Notably, the p lanners did not th ink tha t 
enough lift could be acquired to move a brigade 
g r o u p to S a u d i Arab ia immed ia t e ly ; t h e y 
estimated that it would take 8 to 10 weeks to 
fully deploy the formation. 
These a s s u m p t i o n s were cri t ical in t he 
creation of the more detailed contingency plan 
Operation BROADSWORD. The Chief of the 
Defence Staff (CDS), General de Chastelain , 
ordered a staff check with the aim of analyzing 
the factors influencing the deployment a n d 
employment of a viable brigade group to support 
U.N. coalition action against Iraq. This staff check 
was prepared by 13 November, and added more 
detail to the FMC HQ staff check. The CDS check 
as sumed tha t a Middle East deployment would 
rece ive f i rs t p r i o r i t y over e x i s t i n g A r m y 
operations, and tha t resources could be drawn 
from anywhere. Again, it was a s sumed tha t the 
force would be integrated into a higher formation 
(division or corps). Most importantly, this check 
as sumed tha t the force would be based on 4 
Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) 
after augmentation with Operation PENDANT (the 
unit was re-titled for this operation) adding a third 
infantry bat ta l ion with Armoured Personnel 
Carriers and a fourth tank squadron. Four CMBG 
also had to have enough supplies for 30 days of 
operations, and it had to have time to acclimatize. 
It was further assumed that 2 Princess Patricia's 
Iraqi prisoners of war in Saudi Arabia being watched by Canadian and British soldiers. 
(CFPU VSC 91-6224-2) 
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Leopard Is of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade on exercise in Germany. 
(CFPU LRC86 057-4) 
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) would be the 
third infantry battalion. 
The timings for the deployment of 4 CMBG 
to Saudi Arabia in the CDS staff check assumed 
that it would take 7 days to produce the plan, 45 
days to assemble the force, 55 days to move the 
force and 35 days of training and acclimatization 
in-theatre. Some general shortfalls needed to be 
made up, however. The long standing problems 
in Canada's logistics and medical structures, 
problems which had been identified in the 1970s, 
had not been corrected even though major 
attempts at overhaul had taken place in the mid-
1980s. The other critical area was combat 
s u s t a i n m e n t . The problems inheren t in 
reinforcing 4 CMBG in Germany had never been 
solved either, though attempts had been made to 
improve the state of Canada's reserve forces. If 
Canada wanted to sustain a brigade group in-
theatre for a period longer than six months, 
reserve forces would have to be employed, and 
there was no job protection legislation to 
guarantee Militia soldiers their livelihood once 
they returned from the Gulf. 
While the CDS staff check was undergoing 
review, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark met 
with his American counterpart, James Baker, in 
Bermuda on 13 November. The effect of this 
meeting on the CDS tasking instruction for 14 
November is unclear, but the media speculated 
that the Americans sounded out Clark on sending 
land forces to Saudi Arabia. Whatever the impact, 
1st Canadian Division HQ was tasked to prepare 
a plan to deploy a mechanized brigade group to 
Saudi Arabia, and this plan was to be called 
Operation BROADSWORD. For all intents and 
purposes, this tasking instruction used the same 
40 
assumptions as the CDS staff check. It should be 
noted here that no decision was made by the 
Canadian Government in November 1990 to 
deploy ground forces to Saudi Arabia; this was a 
military contingency plan in case the Canadian 
Government was asked to do so and committed 
itself to such a course of action. 
Over the next 15 days, the Division and FMC 
HQ planning staffs in Lahr, Kingston and St. 
Hubert laboured to produce a concrete concept 
that would keep the Canadian Government's 
options open. As a result, the BROADSWORD 
plan was an amalgamation of several elements 
that included a concept of operation; a risk 
assessment, a movement estimate, and a casualty 
estimate. 
The concept of opera t ions for 
BROADSWORD, as in the earlier estimates, 
postulated that 4 CMBG would operate as part 
of an allied division within the framework of an 
allied corps. The threat environment in which 4 
CMBG would be operating was a heavily 
armoured one, with the enemy in prepared 
defensive positions in the desert. Iraqi chemical 
capability was as diverse as it is was prolific; 
known enemy chemical weapons included 
mustard blistering agents, phosgene choking 
agents as well as Sarin and Tabun nerve agents. 
The Iraqis were also credited with producing BZ, 
a psychochemical similar to LSD. Finally, the 
enemy had combat experience from the long Iran-
Iraq war; Canadian troops had not been in 
combat since Korea. 
As to tactical employment, 4 CMBG was 
incapable of participating in an advance to 
contact, based on the equipment that it possessed 
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in Germany. Leopard Is and M-113s advancing 
in the open desert were vulnerable to direct fire 
from long range. The p lanners reasoned tha t 4 
CMBG could, however, participate as the reserve 
formation within an armoured division. Once the 
other armoured brigades bypassed strongpoints 
and took on the enemy's a rmoured reserve, 4 
CMBG could be used to assaul t bypassed Iraqi 
units. If the situation worsened, and allied forces 
were forced onto the defensive, the brigade was 
already a t t u n e d a n d equipped for defensive 
operations in an armoured heavy environment. 
Other missions could include flank or screen 
operations on a flank, or corps rear area security. 
With regards to ass igning 4 CMBG to a 
division or corps , t he re were a n u m b e r of 
possibilities. The choice came down to placing 4 
CMBG under the British division or under a U.S. 
division operating within a U.S. Corps. As noted 
earlier, a bias h a d developed against placing 4 
CMBG under British command. This emotional 
bias was, however, backed up with undeniable 
facts. 4 CMBG had not operated with the British 
since 1970 bu t had operated with the Americans 
since 1971. When the list of advantages a n d 
d i s advan tages w a s compiled, the s i tua t ion 
favoured placing 4 CMBG with VII (US) Corps, 
preferably wi th 1st (US) Armored Division. 
Interoperability issues, including liaison officers, 
training and equipment compatibility no longer 
existed between the British and the Canadians. 
Standardization did exist in the form of the usual 
NATO agreements , b u t Britain no longer had 
anyth ing comparable with the Canada-U.S . 
integrated logistics system. As a result, placing 4 
CMBG with the British a rmoured division was 
no longer a reasonable option. 
The organization of 4 CMBG for a Middle East 
deployment was not radically different from having 4 
CMBG a u g m e n t e d in Eu rope by Opera t ion 
PENDANT (a reinforcement plan). 4 CMBG would 
have a f o u r - s q u a d r o n t a n k r e g i m e n t (8th 
Canadian Hussars) plus a recce squadron, while 
the infantry battalions (3 RCR, 2 PPCLI, 1 R22eR) 
would be augmen ted to include three four-
company bat ta l ion s t r u c t u r e s . 444 Tactical 
Helicopter Squadron was having problems with 
the aging Kiowas a n d w a n t e d to c rea te a 
composite squadron with Kiowas and Twin Huey 
light t ranspor ts . The other a rms and services 
required litde modification, at least initially. Some 
planners called for the deployment of a complete 
Canadian Support Group and a Canadian Medical 
Group. This would have increased the n u m b e r 
of troops in theatre from the 7,000 to 9,000 
originally envisioned to 12,000. 
Once the p lanning process was underway, 
un i t s were solicited to provide material a n d 
organizational improvements tha t they deemed 
necessary for a Middle East deployment. Planners 
a t t h e s e v e r a l h e a d q u a r t e r s i nvo lved i n 
BROADSWORD a l so a d d e d c h a n g e s a n d 
suggestions. An attitude developed in many places 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ; t h i s a t t i t u d e c a n b e s t b e 
described as the "We can' t go without " 
s y n d r o m e . T h i s w a s a n u n d e r s t a n d a b l e 
phenomenon since some equipment programmes 
which had been pu t off in 1989 could now be 
i m p l e m e n t e d . Some (bu t n o t all) of t h e s e 
organizational "grafts" included the deployment 
of the new ADATS anti-aircraft system, an artillery 
target acquisition battery, an entire intelligence 
company, a forward replacement holding unit, all 
of 2 ( E l e c t r o n i c War fa re ) S q u a d r o n , a 
decontaminat ion unit , an evacuation company 
and a 400-bed field hospital. Personal equipment 
necessary for fighting in desert environment was 
needed, as well as improved Nuclear, Biological 
C h e m i c a l Defence (NBCD) d e t e c t i o n a n d 
protective gear. This was not a problem, since 
Canada led NATO in the development of NBCD 
protective equipment . Other larger pieces of 
equipment would, however, delay the deployment 
and would increase cost if the decision was made 
to obtain them. 
It would be easy to call this s i tuat ion "gold 
plating" and to blame inter-arm rivalry. The real 
problem was tha t the Canadian Army was still 
playing "catch up" from the 1970s deficiencies 
and the heightened expectations of the 1980s. 
Many of these material improvements had been 
identified by 4 CMBG back in 1985, b u t h a d not 
been solved by 1990. 
The movement estimate for BROADSWORD 
was not encouraging. There was no sealift capability 
organic to the Canadian Forces and this forced 
the logistics p lanners to look to commercial 
shipping. Unfortunately, the Americans h a d 
already hired much of Canada 's commercial sea 
and air lift to suppor t their own deployment 
ope ra t ions . Even the Uni ted Kingdom w a s 
chartering Eas te rn Bloc shipping to move the 
balance of their division to Saudi Arabia! The use 
41 
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Above left: Canadian medical personnel arrive in Saudi Arabia; Above right: Canadian 
doctors perform surgery on an Iraqi prisoner of war. (CFPU ISC 91 -6210-1 & ISC 91 -4435) 
of t h e l a r g e R O / R O (Roll o n / R o l l off) 
Newfoundland ferries was contemplated, but this was 
no t feasible for pol i t ica l r e a s o n s . Moving 
manpower was less of a problem; agreements 
b e t w e e n t h e C a n a d i a n G o v e r n m e n t a n d 
commercia l air carr iers in C a n a d a ensured 
Canada ' s ability to move troops and some light 
equipment. The apparent lack of heavy lift would 
probably have imposed a significant time delay 
on the deployment of 4 CMBG if BROADSWORD 
were authorized and implemented. 
Another problem that the planners had to deal 
with was conflicting casualty estimates which were 
driven by extremely pessimistic threat assessments 
e m a n a t i n g from American sources . Medical 
specialists calculated that, given 30 days of combat, 
the entire brigade group would need replacement. 
They est imated that , out of a 9,000 m a n force, 
there would be 1,971 killed and 7,434 wounded. 
Other BROADSWORD p lanne r s developed a 
smal ler es t imate in which 3,000 killed a n d 
wounded would need replacement after thirty 
days. Another DND agency put the rates at 1,000 
killed and 3,472 wounded- It appears as if these 
estimates were based on the Iran-Iraq War, which 
was a First World War attrition-type of conflict. 
They also failed to take into account the fact that 
the allied coalition being formed was in every way 
a far superior military machine t han what Iraq 
42 
could m u s t e r in t e rms of overwhelming air 
support, initiative and manoeuverability. 
By 20 November the window on deployment 
was closing fast. On 29 November, the U.N. 
Security Council passed Resolution 678, which 
set a 15 J a n u a r y 1991 deadline for Saddam 
Hussein to move his forces out of Kuwait. When 
asked on 7 December 1990 as to the feasibility 
of BROADSWORD in light of this development, 
1st Canadian Division p lanners replied: "There 
are no show stoppers per se b u t one issue, the 
composition and availability of batt le casual ty 
replacement could impose limitations on the 
employment of 4 CMB(G) plus." 
BROADSWORD hung on the wall for the next 
month. On 12 January 1991, an anonymous military 
source recently re turned from Germany leaked 
significant aspects of BROADSWORD to the 
media, including the size, composition and the 
possibility tha t the brigade might come unde r 
British command. The source was motivated by 
a belief that BROADSWORD planning was being 
done behind the backs of the Canadian people 
under instructions of the Mulroney Government, 
and that the Canadian people were not being given 
a say in the deployment of troops overseas. He 
was mistaken in his assertions. BROADSWORD 
planning was anticipatory on the pa r t of the 
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military in the event the Government wished to 
select a ground force option. It was not designed 
to circumvent the democratic process. Naturally, 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y cr i t ics of the Gove rnmen t ' s 
handling of the Gulf s i tuat ion pounced on the 
issue wi thout having the facts and roundly 
criticized the government . By 14 J a n u a r y , 
Minister of National Defence Bill McKnight told 
the media that the Government had no intention 
of sending a brigade to the Gulf. Two days later 
the air a ssau l t s tarted, and by 28 February the 
land portion of the campaign was complete. 
It is easy to say that 4 CMBG was not needed 
in Saudi Arabia, tha t it could not have arrived in 
t ime to do a n y t h i n g , a n d t h a t i t w a s no t 
sustainable. Comments such as this can only be 
made in retrospect, however, since we know now 
how short the war actually was. At the time many 
planners believed that the ground war would last 
several weeks to many months . There was no 
indication tha t it would last only 100 hours . If it 
had been a longer war, Canadian land forces 
would have been a valuable contribution. 
Why was Opera t ion BROADSWORD not 
implemented? The answer to this question is multi-
faceted and the reasons are found at many levels. It 
is unclear at this point which level of command made 
the decision not to go. There are four possibilities 
here. The first is that the politicians wanted to go 
with ground troops but were convinced by the highest 
military level that BROADSWORD was not a feasible 
undertaking. The second option is that the politicians 
did not want to go and told the military no. There 
could have been a combination of these reasons, 
whereby the political level did not want to go and the 
highest military level did not encourage them to 
implement BROADSWORD. Fourthly, the highest 
military level might not have p a s s e d on or 
recommended to the political level the existence and 
advanced na tu re of BROADSWORD beyond the 
list of options created in August. 
Some were not convinced of BROADSWORD'S 
feasibility. Let us briefly explore some reasons why 
BROADSWORD was not considered to be a viable 
operation: 
1. BROADSWORD was not logistlcally feasible; 
we could not get enough lift In time, existing 
lift was dominated by the Americans. 
2. If we had gotten to Saudi Arabia, our 
equipment (particularly tanks) was not 
capable of matching Iraqi equipment on the 
battlefield; there was not enough equipment. 
3. BROADSWORD was not sustainable from 
a personnel and equipment battle casualty 
replacement point of view. 
4. There was not enough time to get to the 
theatre, train and acclimatize before the 
ground war started. 
5. The Canadian people would not have 
supported the ground war or we didn't need 
to deploy ground forces. 
6. BROADSWORD was a fundamentally flawed 
concept b e c a u s e it was b a s e d on a 
mechanized brigade group. 
7. BROADSWORD would have cost too much. 
8. BROADSWORD demonstrates that the 
NATO Central Region commitment was not 
workable either. 
The lift, deployment time and equipment 
q u e s t i o n s c a n be d i s c u s s e d together . The 
assumption that 4 CMBG would be operating with 
VII (US) Corps (and probably with 1st (US) 
Armored Division) w a s b a s e d on the close 
relationship 4 CMBG h a d developed with the 
Americans since 1971. Four CMBG already h a d 
liaison officers with VII (US) Corps and 1st (US) 
Armored Division (two of them, Major K.D. Mohr 
and Lieutenant-Colonel N.H. Connally were 
invited to go and were given permission to do so, 
Major Mohr seeing action with 1st (US) Armored 
Division) and the Americans respected Canadian 
capabilities on the battlefield. The U.S. did sound 
out Canada on the ground forces issue while they 
were deciding if and when to send VII (US) Corps. 
If Canada had decided to go at tha t time or even 
late in November, arrangements would have been 
made to deploy 4 CMBG to Saudi Arabia us ing 
the ILOC agreement; the Americans constant ly 
pushed for "more flags" and if Canada seriously 
d e m o n s t r a t e d i t w a s in t e r e s t ed , A m e r i c a n 
support would have been there. In terms of time, 
the British were able to deploy their 4th Armoured 
Brigade (similar in composition to 4 CMBG) from 
BAOR making the decision on 22 November with 
the first uni t s arriving on 10 December. The 
A m e r i c a n s h a d a c o n s t a n t flow of forces 
throughout the period. 
There is no doubt tha t some of Canada ' s 
equipment was in poor shape, not only for the 
43 
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Gulf but for Germany as well. The Leopards were 
showing their age, particularly when one 
compares their protection and firepower to the 
T-72. In terms of interoperability, some equipment 
could receive spare parts through the U.S. system 
since a M-113 is a M-113, an M-109 is an M-109 
and a C-7 is similar to an M-16A2. Other non-
standard equipment like the Leopard, the litis 
and the MLVW would have posed logistical 
problems. The solution here was to acquire 
equipment from the Americans. In fact, the 
Americans unofficially offered enough M-60A3s, 
M-2s and M-109A2s to equip and sustain a 
Canadian brigade group in the same way the 
Americans helped some of the gulf Cooperation 
Council countries (the M-60A3 offer was 
apparently changed to M-l Abrams tanks later). 
These vehicles were already in-theatre and it 
would have been relatively easy to deploy 
Canadian troops and small equipment by air. It 
takes less than two weeks to retrain on a new 
tank and this retraining would have been done 
concur ren t ly in the opera t ional deser t 
environment. 
There have been arguments made that too 
many "bells and whistles" were added to the 
existing brigade structure, that this drove up the 
cost of deployment and that the refitting increased 
the deployment time. This argument does have 
some merit, but there were numerous cases where 
BROADSWORD planners "just said no." On the 
other hand, if 4 CMBG were operating as part of 
VII (US) Corps, why did it need its own 
decontamination capability, target acquisition 
battery, an EW squadron, its own field hospital 
and the brand new AD ATS system? Could these 
resources have been provided by division or 
corps? Exercises in Germany demonstrated time 
and again tha t 4 CMBG was capable of 
assimilating non-Canadian uni ts into its 
organization and planning structure or utilizing 
support provided by a higher headquarters. 
Canada had a "free ride" with these resources in 
Germany since the 1970s; why change now? 
The sustainability question is important for 
it shows a weakness that has existed in the 
Canad ian Army since the Diefenbaker 
Government decided that sustainability forces 
were no longer required. The destruction of the 
Militia in the early 1960s was so profound that 
attempts to remedy the problem still baffle 
defence planners today in 1994. The four-brigade 
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group army concept such as it existed in 1953 
was designed to fight two wars; one in Germany 
and one in Korea, with sustainability coming from 
the two Militia division equivalents. The draw 
down in Army strength in 1970 ensured that there 
were four partially manned brigade groups. The 
events in 1990 show that the wisdom in this draw 
down was more than flawed. The Oka Crisis in 
1990 occupied an entire brigade group (Canada 
even had to approach SACEUR to explain why 
half of 1st Canadian Division was tied up in an 
internal security situation) and this stretched 
Army resources thin. Since the Militia was 
untrained and unequipped for the internal 
security missions, regular forces had to be used 
and flexibility was lost. 
The political problems with calling out the 
Militia to s u s t a i n BROADSWORD were 
insurmountable. No job protection legislation 
existed. Problems with neglected training and a 
lack of equipment meant that Militia personnel 
would have to undergo a significant period of 
training before they were ready to fight in a Middle 
East environment. Despite the limited steps taken 
in the late 1980s (the Total Force Concept) to 
correct this, the Militia's ability to provide battle 
casualty replacements was an unknown factor in 
BROADSWORD planning. The politicians feared 
an opposition backlash and thus would probably 
not have supported such measures early on in 
the deployment. 
The most open-ended argument made against 
BROADSWORD was the belief by some that the 
Canadian people would not have supported such a 
deployment and would have become disillusioned 
when it started to take casualties. The Canadian 
public was overwhelmingly in favour of military 
operations within the context of the U.N. 
resolutions. There was only a minuscule "peace 
movement" consisting of a few students. Naturally, 
the media made this movement out to be more 
than it was and the Opposition parties played this 
for all it was worth to embarrass the Mulroney 
Government as much as possible. If the Prime 
Minister chose to deploy ground forces to Saudi 
Arabia, he would have done so after explaining 
the reasons for his decision. These reasons would 
probably have focused on the need to limit existing 
aggression and deter future aggression and the 
need to provide economic stability in the West. 
The spectre of Saddam Hussein developing 
nuclear weapons only increased the reasons for 
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the DESERT STORM. Canadians are a practical 
people who have fought wars for lesser reasons 
in the past. 
Suggesting that a Canadian brigade group was 
not needed in such a conflict is an extension of the 
argument against having a Canadian brigade group 
in Europe. Canada cannot afford to be isolationist in 
the world community and m u s t act in difficult 
situations. The loss of prestige is not an easy thing 
to measure b u t the deployment of low risk forces 
like two combat ships and a squadron of fighters to 
protect them certainly made Canada look cautious 
and minimalist. The ridiculous political debate over 
how "defensive" the FRICTION and SCIMITAR forces 
were supposed to be was laughable. The deployment 
of a Canadian field hospital to Saudi Arabia and 
medical personnel to U.S. ships was less laughable, 
particularly to the casualties that they treated, bu t 
Canada perhaps could have done more in other 
areas. 
As to the financing of a Saudi Arabia deployment, 
it is conceivable that many of Canada's out of pocket 
costs would have eventually been funded by Saudi 
Arabia and the Japanese . Participating in a war 
of liberation not only carries with it a sense of 
moral satisfaction b u t also provides bus iness 
opportunit ies for the inevitable reconstruct ion 
effort, as discussed by the British commander, 
General Sir Peter De La Billiere in his book Storm 
Command. 
Was a mechanized brigade group the only 
option for a Canadian Army deployment to the 
Gulf? A n u m b e r of officers have questioned this 
basic assumption in the BROADSWORD planning 
process and they have a valid point. There were 
other options; how many of them saw light of day 
in high level planning discussions is unknown. 
The CDS believed tha t only an independent 
brigade group-sized commitment would be a 
viable one for political purposes within a coalition. 
One possible option was a light infantry brigade 
group of three infantry battalions operating with, 
say, the 101st (US) Airborne Division (Airmobile) 
or the 82nd (US)Airborne Division. Units from 
the Special Service Force based in Canada had 
good working relationships with these formations. 
Such a brigade group could have been delivered 
by air in a timely manner. 
If the viability of a Canadian mechanized 
brigade group operating in the Middle East was 
in quest ion, one should examine the forces 
deployed by the British and the French. The 
British 4th Armoured Brigade was deployed in 
less t han a mon th from its bases in Northern 
Germany. It consisted of an armoured regiment, 
two mechanized infantry ba t ta l ions a n d an 
artillery regiment; almost identical to 4 CMB in 
G e r m a n y b u t w i t h b e t t e r e q u i p m e n t . I ts 
p e r f o r m a n c e i n t h e Gulf War, t h o u g h 
overshadowed by 7th Brigade, was part icularly 
effective in reducing bypassed Iraqi strong points. 
The French 6e DLB (6th Light Armoured 
Divis ion) h a d t h r e e m e c h a n i z e d i n f a n t r y 
battalions mounted in VAB wheeled APCs, three 
armoured regiments (one t ank and two heavy 
armoured car), an artillery regiment and two 
at tack helicopter regiments with 60 ant i - tank 
helicopters. This formation was unsu i t ed to a 
frontal assau l t role against the enemy's main 
defensive positions; as a resul t it was relegated 
to the very important role of flank guard on the 
left flank of the main effort. 6e DLB did not sit 
out the war; it operated in an aggressive fashion 
within the limits of its capabilities. 
Unlike the Brit ish a n d French forces, a 
Canadian mechanized brigade deploying to the 
Gulf would not have been sustainable over a long 
period without a radical change in Canadian 
mobil izat ion policy. This d ic ta t ed t h a t t he 
operational employment of the Brigade in the Gulf 
would have to be considered carefully. These 
employment op t ions were cons ide red by a 
planning cell in Ottawa and this cell concluded 
tha t a brigade based on the existing European 
commitment could have fulfilled a n u m b e r of 
roles in the Coalition plan, that is, flank gua rd / 
screening, counter-penetra t ion a n d blocking. 
These employment options were based on the 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t the Brigade would no t be 
s u s t a i n a b l e for a long p e r i o d , t h e s a m e 
assumpt ions which h a d been used in Central 
Region planning for twenty years. However, these 
e m p l o y m e n t op t ions a s developed by t h i s 
p l a n n i n g cell do no t a p p e a r to have b e e n 
disseminated widely and there is little discussion 
of them in the BROADSWORD plan. 
Though m a n y shor tcomings (specifically 
equipment and lift) were "overcomable" if the effort 
and initiative h a d been made in November, the 
casualty estimates and the sustainability problem 
gave the h igher level mil i tary a n d political 
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l e ade r sh ip cold feet. O n e BROADSWORD p l a n n e r 
t h o u g h t t h a t t h i s w a s t h e p r i m a r y r e a s o n for n o t 
dep loy ing to t h e Gulf: 
I hones t ly believe the reason tha t it got 
handicapped or turned off was that people 
realized there would be casualties. There was 
DEATH involved! It was pretty easy to continue 
to sit offshore, embargo shipping, fly some 
airplanes, come back to a relatively secure 
environment....The government could see that 
we were talking 30 casualties a day, half of them 
being d e a t h s . Tha t was s t a r t l ing to the 
politicians... 
Another p l a n n e r h a d a similar point of view: 
We may have been too pessimistic. The casualty 
estimates were up there and the shopping lists 
too big. That was the straw that broke the camel's 
back. When all was accumulated, with the high 
risk assessment and a long shopping list, the 
thing became intolerable and it was cancelled. I 
wonder what would have happened if we had 
gone with a less grandiose shopping list....The 
Chief [ultimately] did not recommend it to the 
political level. 
The operational commanders for BROADSWORD 
certainly believed that the plan was a good one and 
tha t it was capable of being executed. Many 
logisticians also believed tha t the movement 
problem could have been overcome, and that the 
equipment could have been acquired quickly. 
What was lacking was the will to do it. 
The most important quest ion here is, does 
the failure to execute BROADSWORD "prove" that 
the NATO brigade commitment was not a viable 
one? (At least one Canadian Admiral h a s made 
this assertion). Many well informed people think 
that the answer is no. To redeploy a brigade group 
to an entirely new and unfamiliar theatre of 
opera t ions aga ins t a new enemy canno t be 
compared to having a brigade in-theatre with 
intimate knowledge of the ground, its allies and 
its enemy. There is no doubt that the sustainment 
and logistical problems were significant, and 
would have posed problems in NATO's Central 
Region. This ignores tha t fact tha t Canadian 
planners knew what the problems were and were 
not given the guidance and political suppor t 
necessary to fix them prior to 1985. The Canadian 
soldier's ability to improvise and make things 
happen should never be underestimated. A NATO 
war would have been more important than a Gulf 
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deployment, and the entire national effort would 
have been directed to support ing the Central 
Region. 
In sum, Operation BROADSWORD represents 
possibly one of the biggest "what if s" in Canadian 
mil i tary h is tory . It w a s no t only a m i s sed 
opportunity. BROADSWORD also highlighted 
some of the s t ruc tura l weaknesses tha t have 
existed in the Canadian Army since 1970 and 
should provide guidance for future defence policy 
makers and military planners . 
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